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Abstract 
Contemporary thought is moving away from the notion that the human is a clear-cut concept. 
In particular, non-anthropocentric views are proliferating within the interdisciplinary area of critical 
posthumanism, with emphasis on non-dualistic views on relations between human and technology. In 
this article, the author shows how such a view can inform electroacoustic and computer music 
practice, and sees improvisation linked with composition as a fruitful avenue in this. Following a 
philosophical preparation and a discussion of relevant music discourse, two computer music works 
created by the author are discussed to demonstrate a model of music-making which merges 
composition and improvisation, based on the concepts of cognitive assemblages and intra-action, 
following the writings of N. Katherine Hayles and Karen Barad respectively. The works employ 
techniques related to artificial intelligence and cybernetics, such as machine learning algorithms, 
agent-based organisation and feedback systems. It is argued that the acousmatic sound domain is an 
important aspect of sound in this practice. The research is thus situated not only in the frames of 





Since technology has a distinct role in defining the constraints and potentials of improvisation in 
electronic music, technical preparation often becomes an important aspect of an improviser’s 
performance practice. A central consideration in this respect is the question of what constraints to set 
and on what level to pitch the creative register in a performance. If we want to start with nothing, an 
empty code interpreter or an unpatched modular system theoretically provide some of the widest 
horizons for sonic adventure, but we may then be facing distracting technical challenges and a degree 
of ‘performative latency’ due to the time it takes to code or patch. Reducing input modalities can 
make a system more intuitive and imply limiting the sonic potentials to a more instrumental level, 
which can provide creative constraints and engender nuanced performance. If we embed cognition 
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and agency in the technology, we may be able maintain direct performance agency, and 
simultaneously allow for a virtually unlimited complexity of structure and morphology in the music, 
without losing real-time dynamics. But that comes at a cost: a human performer in such a context can 
have a great degree of intuitive, bodily agency and influence on sound, but will have to sacrifice some 
control of some of the music as well, because much of it generated by a computer algorithm.  
In this article I discuss my recent practice-based research, which explores such an approach 
with an interest in how algorithmically generated synthetic sound behaves in human-computer 
improvisation, and the acousmatic qualities of such sound in a multichannel spatial setting. The thesis 
is that engaged listening, spontaneity, and bodily agency are virtues of improvisation which can be 
conditioned by a technical system that also is engaged in listening, acting and spontaneous 
organisation. Developing technical systems in this manner is a process more akin to composition than 
instrument-design, if we think of composition as the defining of a distinct aesthetic sound 
environment and a topological network of sounds and structures to explore through improvisation. 
The blurring of distinctions between design, technology and composition is, as Thor Magnusson has 
written, almost innate to electronic and digital musics:  
 
The instruments become epistemic, composed, often directly fusing the instrument with the 
composition, as exemplified in the work of David Tudor, Gordon Mumma or Erkki 
Kurenniemi; where the instrument constitutes the piece, for example in the work of Éliane 
Radigue or Morton Subotnick; or where a specific technique becomes the theory and 
aesthetics of a new piece, as with Stockhausen or Xenakis’ (Magnusson 2019: 57).   
 
However, this also has consequences for how we view improvisation in relation to composition. In 
this article, improvisation is regarded as an expression of agency and contingency through exploration 
of sound within the topological constraints of a system. Agency here refers to the ability for a 
performer to intervene or influence in a timely manner (Armstrong 2012), but it also applies to the 
ability of computational processes to act. Contingency implies that the music has a dependence on 
agency, but also that any agency is contingent and, philosophically speaking, not strictly necessary: it 
is precisely the fact that it could be otherwise that reveals that a performance constitutes a unique 
creative process. Thus, definitions overlap: designing through composing is done in the aim of 
composing through improvisation, one bringing the other into fruition. 
The term ‘post-acousmatic’, coined by Monty Adkins, Richard Scott and Pierre Alexandre 
Tremblay (2016), is relevant here. The neologism applies to ‘specific areas of practice that engage 
with acousmatic thinking whether they be 1) influenced by it, 2) an augmentation of its practice or 3) 
a critique of it’ (ibid.: 108). All three of these criteria apply here: much of the aesthetic thinking has 
an ancestry in acousmatic theory, while developing new ways of addressing the acousmatic in 
 3 
composition and performance, but also rethinking some of the fundamental assumptions about music 
and sound that acousmatic music tends to be based upon. Adkins et al. make several observations 
concerning aspects of acousmatic music which are challenged here too, including how ‘most 
acousmatic works follow [a] traditional notion of musical linearity’ (ibid.: 109) associated with the 
era ‘prior to the emergence of the Darmstadt avant-garde’, and how this linearity is also manifest in a 
gestural and physical cause-and-effect phrasing, based on the  ‘notion of an ‘event’ which has 
consequences’ (ibid). Especially important is what Adkins et al. write about acousmatic composition 
and performance practice:  
 
Acousmatic music, by developing almost entirely as a studio-based compositional practice 
with only the diffusion of fixed works remaining of its live performative aspect, has accepted 
and indeed further exaggerated the separation of compositional time and performance time it 
inherited from European classical music. The aspects of live musical practice that the 
acousmatic paradigm has profoundly abandoned – extemporisation, variation, variability of 
performance parameters, and sharing the moment of invention with the audience – are exactly 
those which free improvisation has vigorously reasserted. (ibid.: 111) 
 
I want to celebrate these aspects of live musical practice and present the acousmatic as an osmosis of 
human and technological agency. I draw from posthumanist discourse to explain these views and their 
consequences for relevant music discourse. I will discuss two works – Texton Mirrors and Intra-
action – to demonstrate theory in practice. 
 
2. POSTHUMAN COGNITION AND INTRA-ACTION 
 
N. Katherine Hayles (1999) has discussed the concept of the ‘posthuman’ as a reassessment of the 
very notion of the human, in favour of a subject for whom mind is not primary, and body is “the 
original prosthesis we all learn how to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other 
prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born” (Hayles 1999: 3). 
Cybernetics, the interdisciplinary science named by Norbert Wiener and colleagues, which 
encompassed “the entire field of control and communication theory, whether in the machine or in the 
animal” (Wiener 2013: 11), implied “that the boundaries of the human subject are constructed rather 
than given. Conceptualizing control, communication, and information as an integrated system 
cybernetics radically changed how boundaries were conceived” (Hayles 1999: 84). For Hayles, the 
most important implication of the posthuman was not bio-technological hybrid organisms or 
prostheses, but rather the opportunity to envision human embodiment and consciousness as 
distributed processes. Hayles explains her conception of the posthuman as follows: 
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Whereas the ‘human’ has since the Enlightenment been associated with rationality, free will, 
autonomy and a celebration of consciousness as the seat of identity, the posthuman in its more 
nefarious forms is construed as an informational pattern that happens to be instantiated in a 
biological substrate. There are, however, more benign forms of the posthuman that can serve 
as effective counterbalances to the liberal humanist subject, transforming untrammelled free 
will into a recognition that agency is always relational and distributed, and correcting an over-
emphasis on consciousness to a more accurate view of cognition as embodied throughout 
human flesh and extended into the social and technological environment.  (Hayles 2006: 61) 
 
Hayles has since developed her view on cognition further, based on neuroscientific 
discoveries showing that human consciousness is powered by a more pervasive ‘nonconscious 
cognition’1, and that such nonconscious cognition also exists in all biological life forms, and in 
computational technical systems: 
 
Consciousness occupies a central position in our thinking not because it is the whole of 
cognition but because it creates the (sometimes fictitious) narratives that make sense of our 
lives and support basic assumptions about worldly coherence. Cognition, by contrast, is a 
much broader capacity that extends far beyond consciousness into other neurological brain 
processes; it is also pervasive in other life forms and complex technical systems. Although the 
cognitive capacity that exists beyond consciousness goes by various names, I call it 
nonconscious cognition. (Hayles 2017: 9) 
 
For Hayles, nonconscious cognition ‘provides a bridge between human, animal, and technical 
cognitions, locating them on a continuum rather than understanding them as qualitatively different 
capacities’(Hayles 2017: 67)2. Central to the argument is that ‘nonconscious cognitions in biological 
organisms and technical systems share certain structural and functional similarities, specifically in 
building up layers of interactions from low-level choices, and consequently very simple cognitions, to 
higher cognitions and interpretations’ (Hayles 2017: 13, author’s italics). Although she does not see a 
close parallel between technical systems and self-aware consciousness, the relation is closer on the 
nonconscious cognitive level: 
 
 
1 Nonconscious here should not be confused with the psychoanalytical unconscious, which is considered part of 
higher consciousness (Hayles 2017).  
2 This work also parallels the ideas put forward by Humberto Maturana (Maturana 1974) and Francisco Varela  
(Varela 1997) in their work on cognition and autopoiēsis, as well as the science of cognitive biology.   
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Like human nonconscious cognition, technical cognition processes information faster than 
consciousness, discerns patterns and draws inferences and, for state-aware systems, processes 
inputs from subsystems that give information on the system's condition and functioning. 
Moreover, technical cognitions are designed specifically to keep human consciousness from 
being overwhelmed by massive informational streams so large, complex, and multifaceted 
that they could never be processed by human brains. (Hayles 2017: 11) 
 
Importantly, Hayles avoids equating cognition with intelligence. She sets cognition at a relatively low 
threshold by defining it as ‘a process that interprets information within contexts that connect it with 
meaning' (Hayles 2017: 22, author’s italics). She outlines the idea of a ‘cognitive assemblage’ as a 
collective of different cognitive systems that can span across biological life and technological media. 
While the idea of extended mind or extended cognition is not at all new (c.f. Varela, Rosch and 
Thompson 2016; Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Clark 2008), Hayles takes specific interest in 
technological systems within cognitive assemblages, and ‘the implication that arrangements can scale 
up, progressing from very low-level choices into higher levels of cognition and consequently 
decisions affecting larger areas of concern.’ Further, she explains that, ‘because humans and technical 
systems in a cognitive assemblage are interconnected, the cognitive decisions of each affect the 
others, with interactions occurring across the full range of human cognition, including 
consciousness/unconscious, the cognitive nonconscious, and the sensory/perceptual systems that send 
signals to the central nervous system’ (2017: 118). The cases studied in her book include 
infrastructural traffic control systems, personal digital assistants, social signalling and somatic 
surveillance.  
Body and mind are contingent not only upon non-conscious cognitive processes but also 
‘technogenesis’, “the idea that humans and technics have coevolved together” (Hayles 2012: 10). The 
consequence of this is that the human is deeply enmeshed with technology in a manner that is not 
clearly hierarchical. Karen Barad (2007) uses the term ‘intra-action’ to describe a phenomenon or 
process that has several agencies within itself, which bring one another into existence. In this view, 
causality is not a one-way process, but rather traced to ‘agential separability’ and ‘exteriority within 
phenomena’ (2007: 177). Barad’s posthumanism emphasises performativity and how ‘phenomena are 
specific material performances of the world’ (ibid.: 335). Moreover, Barad explains, ‘agency is about 
possibilities for worldly reconfigurings. So agency is not something possessed by humans, or non-
humans for that matter. It is an enactment. And it enlists, if you will, “non-humans” as well as 
“humans”’ (Barad in Dolphijn and van der Tuin 2012: 54). 
Intra-action is a concept which shows how a phenomenon such as sound or music is 
composed of agential encounters but simultaneously cannot be reduced to these. It can also show how 
technological and human agencies are entangled in creative processes. However, as Hayles argues, 
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though agency is present everywhere, even in material objects, computational media and biological 
organisms are unique because they are capable of making decisions. This is also a key reason why the 
human relation to technology is different where computational media are concerned. Magnusson has 
also emphasised that this cognitive dimension, along with the abstract symbolic design process of 
software, make the digital musical instrument ‘an epistemic tool: a designed tool with such a high 
degree of symbolic pertinence that it becomes a system of knowledge and thinking in its own terms’ 
(2009: 168). Thus, the divide between materiality and information discussed by Hayles is evident in 
computer music too, since ‘code as material is not musical; it does not vibrate; it is merely a set of 
instructions turned into binary information converted to an analogue electronic current in the 
computer’s soundcard’ (Ibid.: 172). As Robert Seaback (2020) has also recently showed, following 
Hayles, this process does constitute a materialisation of information in sound. Though cognitive tools 
are proliferating widely as artificial intelligence is applied within creative practices, this is of course 
in most cases not implying autonomous computational creativity, but rather notions more similar to 
what Artemis-Maria Gioti (2020) terms ‘co-creativity’ or ‘extended intelligence’, featuring a human-
computer liaison rather than an exclusive or competitive model. 
 
3. REVEALING DETOURS: IMPROVISATION AS POIĒSIS 
 
In his criticism of the ‘instrumental and anthropological definition of technology’ (Heidegger 1977: 
5), according to which technology is a means to human ends, Martin Heidegger emphasised how 
technology is a poiēsis, a ‘bringing-forth’, or ‘revealing’: ‘through bringing-forth, the growing things 
of nature as well as whatever is completed through the crafts and the arts come at any given time to 
their appearance’ (ibid: 11). As Bernard Stiegler puts it, this process ‘brings into being what is not’ 
and ‘the final cause is not the efficient operator but being as growth and unfolding’ (Stiegler 1998: 9). 
Here, the ‘efficient operator’ is the human master, and ‘being’ is phusis, or nature. Also referring to 
Heidegger, Ferrando (2019) cites musical improvisation or poetry-writing as examples of poiēsis: 
processes which, although they may have premeditated elements, are also characterised by surprise 
and discovery, as something new is revealed. This might be paralleled with Bruno Latour’s metaphor 
of the detour, describing ‘the labyrinth that [one] will have to confront before pursuing [one’s] initial 
objectives’ (2002: 251), a journey which transforms both means and ends. Derek Bailey’s view on 
improvisation seems a good match with these ideas:  
 
Although some improvisors employ a high level of technical skill in playing their instrument, 
to speak of ‘mastering’ the instrument in improvisation is misleading. The instrument is not 
just a tool but an ally. It is not only a means to an end, it is a source of material, and technique 
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for the improvisor is often an exploitation of the natural resources of the instrument (Bailey 
1993: 99).  
 
Both composition and improvisation are technological detours, involving discovery and revelation. 
But how do we experience this poiēsis?  
A common, though perhaps traditional, perspective on electronic live performance is that it is 
difficult for the spectator to engage with the performance because they cannot see what the performer 
is doing, or do not understand how the instrument works. Does this suggest that the technology is 
occluding rather than revealing the creative process? Implicitly, computer technology always reveals 
itself by producing sound not traced to human or acoustic causes, perhaps by doing what humans and 
acoustic causes cannot do. Simultaneously, we may not know exactly what it is doing because the 
causal mechanism of sound is hidden in code and circuitry. This unknown dimension is also present, 
though in a different sense, in acoustic performance. Part of the excitement about, for example, 
virtuosity, or extended techniques, might be that what we hear defies what we thought was possible. 
A challenge with computer technology, then, is that sonically, virtually anything is possible, since 
acoustic mechanics and bodily human skill are not necessarily constraining the potentials of the 
system. Echoing this instrumental perspective, Denis Smalley has raised concerns about the potential 
incoherence caused by performance interfaces and processing in live performance: 
 
Thus we can arrive at a situation where sounding spectro-morphologies do not correspond 
with perceived physical gesture: the listener is not adequately armed with a knowledge of the 
practicalities of new "instrumental' capabilities and limitations, and articulatory subtlety is not 
recognized and may even be reduced compared with the traditional instrument (creating what 
I call a minus-instrument). The puzzled listener can be forgiven for not knowing whether to 
ascribe perceived musical deficiencies to a minus-instrument, the performer, or the composer. 
(1996: 104)  
 
Indeed, electronic and computer music systems, and their associated hardware, such as modular 
synths, laptops, and controllers, may not offer as direct a causal link between human agency and 
sound model, as do acoustic instruments. However, although Smalley’s statement makes sense to an 
audience primed on instrumental music – as was more likely the case when the words above were 
written – today’s music enthusiasts are not necessarily conditioned by instrumental music practice, 
and may not consider acoustic instruments and sounds as archetypal for music. Moreover, the 
instrumental analogy is tied to gesture and the notion that sounds carry human expression and body 
language, thus anchoring the music in human cause and intention. Gesture also draws attention away 
from many of the characteristics that are distinct about computational or electroacoustic sound, which 
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carry material qualities and a spontaneous autonomy not linked to human and acoustic causes. My 
posthuman perspective takes interest precisely in the reframing of human agency by the encounters 
with more speculative sound ecologies, where humanity has to define itself in relation to the 
unfamiliar. This is a context where all agency – ‘human’ or ‘computational’ – is technologically 
mediated, and where sounds that are activated by human gesture may not have morphological profiles 
corresponding with acoustic cause and effect and with human body language. As human agency is 
nested within a wider agential and nonconscious cognitive matrix, Hayles’ ‘posthuman subject’ 
emerges, as an ‘an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational 
entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction’ (1999: 3). Gesture loses 
its rhetorical power, as ‘the presumption that there is agency, desire, or will belonging to the self and 
clearly distinguished from the “wills of others” is undercut in the posthuman’ (ibid.: 3-4). The liaison 
of agency and contingency can therefore subsume gesture within a distributed ecology where any 
processes or sounds can act and choose, hinging on an awareness of time, change and potentials, and 
conditioned through composition strategies where time is contingent on performance. A parallel 
might be drawn to Earle Brown’s compositions, of which Morton Feldman said that ‘when the 
performer is made more intensely aware of time, he also becomes more intensely aware of the action 
or sound he is about to play. The result is a heightened spontaneity which only performance itself can 
convey’ (Feldman quoted in Bailey 1993: 60). Attributes such as ‘spontaneity’, ‘risk of failure’ and 
‘indeterminacy’, which Kerry Hagan (2016) associates with live performance, or Simon Emmerson’s 
notion of ‘living presence’ (2007), become palpable. In this situation, sound virtually frames the 
performance-technology domain (Nyström 2018b), and any uncertainties in the linkage between cause 
and effect is ‘sound unseen’ (Kane 2014), an acousmatic added value (Chion 1990), located explicitly 
in the computational domain, where human agency is absorbed in currents of information, which are 
transformed into sound. The poiēsis, then, is propelled precisely by the posthuman agency and 
contingency of a system (human and computer) engaged in improvisation. Agency and contingency 
are situated in a recursive, intra-active relation, one bringing the other into existence. Since 
improvisation is inherently processual, and technology is not a means to an end any more than 
performance is, we arrive at a recursive definition of ‘artefact’ or ‘work’, where what is being created 
is the process of creation, or as Latour has put it, ‘the end of the means’ (Latour 2002).   
3.1 Acousmatic Black Boxes 
Magnusson has pointed out that music technologies, like other technologies, become ‘black boxes’: 
though we know their inputs and outputs, their inner workings and rationales become obscure through 
repeated and transforming usage (Magnusson 2009). As Latour explains, ‘[t]he more technological 
systems proliferate, the more they become opaque, so much so that the growth of the rationality of the 
means and ends (according to the conventional model) is manifested precisely by the successive 
 9 
accumulation of layers, each of which makes the preceding ones more obscure’ (2002: 251). 
Magnusson reminds us that black boxes appear differently to the designer, who ‘creates the 
instrument from a conceptual understanding of the domain encapsulated by it’, and to the user, who 
‘gains operational knowledge that emerges through use (or habituation) and not from abstract 
understanding of the internal functionality’ (2009: 171). He notes the added complexity created by the 
fact that the designer and performer frequently are the same person, who has to alternate between two 
roles. From my point of view, black-boxing occurs repeatedly during the making of a work, as 
programmed objects are created and linked to others. In performance, when objects process data and 
make decisions, they begin to form a matrix of nonconscious cognisers, whose individual existences I 
may forget about, though depend upon. The input is reduced from code to a handful of controllers, 
which reveal complex sounds via highly constrained physical input modalities. These works, then, 
may be thought of as acousmatic black boxes, which host both code and physical technology, and are 
realised as compositions realised through improvisation. What happens between input and output is a 
virtual mechanics, embodied in sound; a speculative world revealed in the poiēsis of improvisation. 
The use of the term acousmatic in this context is concurrent with Kane’s view that ‘acousmaticity, the 
determination or degree of spacing between source, cause, and effect’ (Kane 2014: 225), is a 
continuum that depends on a listener’s knowledge – or lack thereof – of a sound’s nature within a 
specific context. Concerns shared with acousmatic fixed-media music – in particular, morphology, 
texture, gesture and spatiality – remain relevant, not least since they carry a causal relation with 
agency and contingency in performance. Improvisation with generative processes reveals an 
acousmatic morphogenesis (Nyström 2017), made palpable in the ongoing activity of performance, 
technology, and space, synthesised by the listener.  
 
4. IN-FORMALISED COMPOSITION 
 
A synergy of design, composition and performance in live electronic music was demonstrated early 
on by pioneers such as Gordon Mumma and David Tudor (Mumma 1975). For computers, Joel 
Chadabe’s ‘interactive composing’ is another example: ‘a two-stage process that consists of (1) 
creating an interactive composing system and (2) simultaneously composing and performing by 
interacting with that system as it functions’ (1984 23). Robert Rowe writes that interactive systems for 
improvisation are a domain of composition where computers have ‘changed the nature of the 
compositional act itself’, precisely because we are building cognising algorithms, thus moving to a 
meta-level of distributed decisions and ceding ‘a large measure of control over musical decision-
making to the human improviser’ (Rowe 1999: 85). George Lewis also demonstrated an entanglement 
of composition and improvisation in his Voyager, ‘a computer program [which] analyzes aspects of a 
human improvisor’s performance in real time, using that analysis to guide an automatic composition 
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(or, if you will, improvisation) program that generates both complex responses to the musician’s 
playing and independent behavior that arises from its own internal processes’ (Lewis 2003: 33). 
While much interactive computer music features acoustic instruments and note-based material, 
Agostino Di Scipio demonstrated an entirely timbre/texture-based approach and reformulated 
interactive composition into ‘composing interactions’ with his audible ecosystems, using sound itself 
and the listening environment as interfaces of interaction (2003). Di Scipio’s ecosystems demonstrate 
an intra-action: acts of listening and sound-making occur within a system that, as a whole, cannot be 
divided into clear-cut agents. 
The nuances in terms of what composition entails within this kind of practice are noteworthy. 
A work might be designed as a circuitry or algorithm which follows a relatively simple scheme even 
if sonic outcomes can be complex. Tudor’s circuit diagram scores are good examples of this; 
Agostino Di Scipio’s audible ecosystems or Dario Sanfilippo’s adaptive systems are other fine 
examples (Sanfilippo 2018). The latter also set a clear boundary for human intervention. However, the 
desire to create a complex system can easily lead to a more interventional composition strategy, where 
the system becomes increasingly heterogenous, due to exceptions to rules which prove too crude 
under certain conditions, and discoveries of relations that are too compelling not to take further. This 
does not necessarily mean that the scope for improvisation reduces, however: the opposite can be 
equally true. The definition and development of the relational structures of the system become a 
process which might be termed in-formalised algorithmic composition, in that the formalisation 
inherent to programming turns on itself when rules add up in a ‘successive accumulation of layers, 
each of which makes the preceding ones more obscure’ (reiterating Latour’s words). In-formalised 
composition continues in improvisation, where sonic spontaneity results from the contingent chain 
reactions of both human and algorithmic agency.  
 
5. STRANGE POSTHUMAN ATTRACTORS 
 
Though employing different techniques between themselves, the two works discussed here have in 
common that they are based on the principle of having an algorithm capture data from performance 
and using that to generate an accumulating and evolving synthesised texture. Typically, the process is 
such that when the performer lets go of the controllers, the texture continues playing autonomously. If 
the performer touches the controllers again they will take over the control mechanism. The algorithms 
do not replicate the performed material, but rather, create derivative textures which carry traces of the 
original input. I started working with this type of method for several reasons. First, it provides a very 
clear method of revealing the poiēsis of improvisation: the material is made up in the moment, and the 
manner in which the system evolves with it is audible. Having both human and computer operate on 
the same material makes the distribution of agency palpable, as it becomes clear that sound is 
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contingent upon both human and computer. Second, the reconstruction and deformation of human 
agency creates sound behaviours that might be termed strange posthuman attractors: 
phenomenologically chaotic systems, embodying both computational processes and human agency. 
Third, the accumulation of performance-derived material establishes a cognitive assemblage of 
human-computer activity, based on nonconscious memory. This allows for a continuity that lets us 
perceive how a history of past actions influences the present moment. Finally, the state of the system 
as a whole of course affects the nature of agency and contingency within it.  
 
6. MACHINE LEARNING IN TEXTON MIRRORS 
 
Both Texton Mirrors and Intra-action are realised entirely in the SuperCollider environment for 
synthesis and algorithmic composition. Texton Mirrors was created and performed in several 
iterations during 2018/19, and most recently presented as part of the AI x Music programme for Ars 
Electronica Festival, Linz, 2019. It is based on the idea of organising a spatially distributed texture as 
a montage of micro-temporal sounds grouped in space, which I refer to as ‘textons’. The concept of 
textons is derived from Bela Julesz’ neuroscientific research in texture perception (Julesz and 
Schumer 1981), which postulates that visual spatial perception is based on the processing of 
microscopic particles of different shapes and orientations. The sonic counterpart is a spatially 
distributed texture which has a rich array of organised sub-fields, as spatially localised streams of 
sound with different characteristics (Nyström 2011). Texton Mirrors was informed by Horacio 
Vaggione’s ‘micro-montage’ composition technique, where sound is assembled in a ‘pointillist’ 
manner (Roads 2005). Working in fixed media, Vaggione emphasises an ‘action-perception 
reciprocity’ in employing both algorithmic processes and manual editing (Criton 2005): this is here 
translated into co-dependence between real-time generated and ‘manually’ performed sound. 
The work makes significant use of machine learning – primarily unsupervised – for 
structuring aggregates of textons based on improvised performance. In addition, several time-sensitive 
processes are used to harness temporal data from the progress of a performance to construct emergent 
structures in both micro and macro-time. The computer system carries out nonconscious cognitive 
organisation of the performed material, in a process which separates the input into groups, and 
generates variations of sounds within these groups. 
The centre of the work is an array of several instances of a synthesis process mapped to pads 
on a MIDI controller. Each pad is controlling its sound via velocity alone, mapped to multiple 
parameters, affecting both spectral and temporal properties of the sound in different ways. As the pads 
are played, a clustering algorithm stores and classifies the parameter data into twelve different sound 
groups. 3 The process works by defining centroids in a parameter space, based on the inputs, each 
 
3 Dan Stowell’s SuperCollider class KMeans is used for this (Stowell 2009). 
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centroid being the centre value of a group. Each new texton is classed as belonging to the group of its 
nearest centroid, but also updates that centroid, so that the centroid will move as the new data is 
entered. The groups are thus not static, but transform over time, as new data enters. The sequence of 
classifications is used to train a Markov set4, which is the basis for generating a texture, based on the 
probability for occurrence of each texton type in succession to another. When the performer stops 
playing, the system continues, generating texture on the basis of the analysis of the performance. Each 
new sound generated is a variation within the confines of its group.5 The texture generator separates 
different groups of textons into spatially localised streams, so that textons from the same group will 
be spatially positioned in relation to one another. The system remembers the spatial location of the 
last occurring texton in each group, so that it can distribute each new sound to its appropriate place. 
Each new texton is incrementally displaced in relation to the previous in its group, so that, over time, 
the different streams keep moving. This incremental spatial movement is a function of time, with the 
effect that short time intervals within the same texton group result in less spatial motion than long 
time intervals. This is to prevent the texture from moving so much that it loses its perceptual 
grouping. If a group coincides spatially with another, one group will shift to make space for the other. 
This has the effect that the streams will self-organise to maintain the coherence of grouping whilst 
also being dynamic. Whilst this process is generating sound, it is also retraining itself, by classifying 
its own output in the same manner that it analyses human performance, which means that the 
centroids of the system keep moving continually. 
From the central texture process, the system branches out by generating other sound material 
in response to performance. Another array of pads with an identical analysis process, but different 
sonorities, is also available, the sounds of which are matched in relation to the first. There are also 
knobs available that increase the probability for additional streams of sound which are selected from 
self-organised maps or searched for nearest match in k-dimensional trees6, in relation to the main 
stream, but mapped to different synthesis processes. The additional texture processes serve to 
introduce sound on both lower and higher timescales by using sequences of time intervals captured 
from performance and creating new figures and patterns from these. Supervised learning is also used 
in the form of artificial neural networks7 (ANN), which have been trained to generate sounds in 
relation to the main texture process under certain circumstances.  
Whilst the system controls the texture, the performer has other sound-generating processes to 
work on, accessible on other pads and knobs. One such process is a set of pads which updates its 
 
4 Julian Rohruber’s SuperCollider class MarkovSet is used for this (Rohruber 2007). 
5 The variations are selected either from a self-organised map, trained by the centroids, from a random mutation 
which meets the classification criteria, or – under certain circumstances – from a memory of groupings earlier in 
the performance. 
6 Dan Stowell’s SuperCollider class KDTree (Stowell 2007). 
7 Nick Collins’ NeuralNet SuperCollider class (2007) 
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synthesis mappings depending on the time and control data derived from performance. This means 
that the mapping transforms under the hands of the performer, in an emergent, time-dependent, but 
not indeterministic manner. This mapping also has a dynamic offset to set the frequency of the output 
sound in relation to spectral properties of other processes in the system. ANN have also been used for 
knobs which feed their position into a calculation which also takes values from other sounds 
happening simultaneously. This means that a performer can acquire a rough intuition about what 
sounds could appear when turning the knob, although it is impossible to predict the exact output as it 
also depends on other elements in the texture. These knobs also have interlinked action so that 
different mappings are activated when certain knobs are played simultaneously. Because all the 
classifications throughout the performance have a history dating back to the original centroids of the 
first twelve sounds, there is an irreversible imprint on the performance from the start. 
 An added dimension to this work is the sounds that become available under the pads as the 
system’s state evolves. The system has been programmed so that after certain performance criteria 
have been met and the overall density is above a certain threshold, additional sounds become 
accessible on the pads. Some of these are mapped using an ANN trained on time intervals between 
pad strokes, so that certain performance patterns will bring additional sounds to the texture. The pads 
also allow complex response to time-dependent gestures which will introduce streams of background 
texture, building up behind the main process. 
The element that gives the system a larger-scale behaviour is a machine listening routine 
which monitors the density of the system as well as spectral centroids of events, regulating its output 
accordingly. This is coupled to an ‘activity rate’ monitor which checks successive time intervals and 
spectra and increases its rate output when the current time interval is shorter than the previous and the 
current frequency is higher than the previous, thus multiplying if the playing or system output 
increases in energy. The durations between the crests of activity that are created over time are used to 
project longer glissandi over time as the work progresses. The spatial distributions of some textures 
also involve a simple form of cellular automata, where spatially distributed synthesis processes are 
controlled in a manner that allows them to self-organise, using topographic synthesis techniques, 
which I have presented elsewhere (Nyström 2018a). 
The mode of spatialisation is different to standard processes where sounds are distributed 
according to a function which does not know what it is distributing. This texture-generating process is 
aware of sound types, temporal pattern, and spatial locations. It is also aware of, and responding to, its 
own output by updating its organisation.  
Performance of Texton Mirrors requires careful listening and attention to controller 
responses. As per basic MIDI protocol, each of the controllers only has one dimension of input: 
velocity for pads and position for knobs. Yet this data is used in a multitude of ways to bring forth a 
large variety of sounds under varying circumstances. Because the system is entirely contingent on 
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input, but also generates sound on its own, human improvisation is made necessary by context. Over 
time, this system increasingly constrains improvisation because it accumulates in an irreversible 
manner, on the basis of its history. The range of possible sounds that can be made in performance 
increases over time, but the complexity of the texture also increases, with the result that there is more 
context to consider and relate actions to. This is intentional, as the idea was for the system to take a 
direction which human performance can influence but not control. 
As a cognitive assemblage, this system includes a human’s listening and physical agency, and 
a listening and learning system which interprets very simple control input information in a complex, 
evolving context, that gives the input meaning and a variety of consequences. A cognitive ‘mirror’ is 
formed as human listening and perception are reflected in texture-organising algorithms, where 
textons are sonic-informational packets of data which human-computer processes act upon. Agency is 
awarded the performer in the form of performance precision, rather than quantity of controllers. 
Although MIDI pads are a blunt instrument, articulating sound within precise velocity ranges 
becomes a bodily skill in itself. Contingency is present in how the interface makes certain sounds 
available under certain conditions, and how much of the texture is based on chains of probabilistic 
decisions, which present an uncertainty of consequence that can generate interesting surprises. 
 
7. LISTENING AGENTS IN INTRA-ACTION 
 
The work Intra-action was commissioned by, and premiered at, NEXT Festival, Bratislava, in 2019. 
It is constructed as an ensemble of synthesis agents which are responding to each other’s behaviours. 
Following Barad’s ideas, the morphological behaviour of each member of the ensemble is defined in 
relation to those of other sounds, since they are always acting upon one another. While Texton 
Mirrors is structured around one main process with numerous tentacles, Intra-action features several 
synthesis processes which are instantiated through human performance, in any order or combination, 
and which continue performing on their own when human control stops, modifying their output by 
listening to other processes. The system is organised around a hub which stores information about the 
most recent output of each member (whether controlled by itself or by human performance); which 
agents are neighbouring one another; which ones are playing or silent. This means that when the 
agents listen to one another, they take in not only the present moment but a longer period’s worth of 
information, so that they are able to make a textural rather than momentary judgement. The algorithm 
plays using data it has stored from performance, but filters this data and adjusts its temporal density 
depending on what else is playing. Each agent listens only to one neighbour, but which one can 
change depending on performance (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the agent relationships). If a 
member agent is alone, it will listen to and respond to itself. If there are many members, each agent’s 
listening target will be determined by their order of appearance in the texture: the most recent member 
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to join will listen to the last one to appear before it, and the ‘oldest’ member listens to the most recent. 
This means that they link up in a circular feedback loop so that all members have an indirect 
consequence on the whole texture. The agents do not always listen, but will drop in more or less 
frequently, at continuously varying probabilities. This is to ensure that actions and consequences 
remain contingent on each member in the collective. In addition to this information feedback, there is 
also an audio loop, where each agent’s output modulates its neighbour agent. This links the synthesis 
processes both timbrally and behaviourally, creating sonorities which are unique to the specific 
constellation of agents and their behaviours. In addition to gathering spectral data from their 
neighbours, all agents are also listening to the density of the whole texture, which can have the 




Figure 1: Listening synthesis agents. Three generic scenarios are illustrated: A single agent performing and 
regulating itself; two agents in a listening loop; and a chain of several agents. The numbers indicate the order in 
which the processes were instigated in performance. If one agent is stopped the others will remap their listening 
chain. 
This system also features an activity rate monitor analysing both audio and control input; this 
is used primarily for dynamically controlling background textures which can be activated optionally 
by the performer. These textures have spectral and temporal motion whose intensity is mapped to the 
activity rate, but whose audio output of course also affects the activity rate. The result is slowly 
accumulating and dissipating waves of sound which add a longer-duration temporal profile to the 
performance, typically reaching peaks every 30 to 60 seconds. An interesting feature from the point of 
view of improvisation is that the system also clocks controller inactivity and will introduce a new 
member to the ensemble by itself if inactivity goes beyond certain temporal thresholds. Knowing that 
the system can introduce new activity may prompt the performer to keep a certain pace in order to 
pre-empt the computer; on the other hand, it can also encourage listening without acting, in 
anticipation of a spontaneous algorithmic intervention. 
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The central physical performance interface is a box of knob controllers, the movement of 
which will both trigger and control parameters of sound. The mappings of Intra-action feature a 
measure of time intervals between controller data, so that the continuous knob controllers become 
sensitive to the velocity at which they are turned, meaning that position and velocity are in constant 
conflict with one another (Nyström 2020). Thus, there is no way of determining mapping output 
without taking the context of time into account. There are several different approaches used for 
velocity of knob movements in the piece, but they are all very sensitive to hand movement, and can 
allow for a multi-dimensional range of output values from a single-dimensional controller, determined 
by awareness of temporal context. Further, several of the knobs are linked so that two knobs need to 
be turned simultaneously in order for sound to be activated and affected. If both knobs are mapped to 
the same sound in different ways, a highly discontinuous mapping will result, where the performer 
has no direct parametric control of the sound. Thus, the knob mappings are a key aspect of the 
morphological potentials of the synthesis processes and the physicality of performance. The synthesis 
techniques used include sine tones and saw waves distorted in various ways, chaotic non-standard 
synthesis oscillators, and processes where control data is directly mapped to wave-form segments via 
arrays which are used as oscillating wave-form envelopes. The spatial distribution principle is similar 
to that of Texton Mirrors, in that the agents self-organise spatially, but they also have a timbral link to 
spatial position: the closer they get to the member to which they are linked, the stronger the 
intermodulation becomes. 
A distinct feature with Intra-action, compared with Texton Mirrors, is that the system has no 
encoded hierarchies between sounds and processes. Though there is a central information hub, there is 
no central sound process, but simply a quantity of synthesis agents which will begin to behave and 
listen for information once they are set in motion. Any module can be started and stopped at the 
performer’s discretion, but all actions have consequences which propagate through the entire texture, 
as a member of the ensemble enters or leaves. Because the controller mappings are time-sensitive and 
non-linear, and the agents behave in an autonomous manner, it is impossible to predict exactly how 
the system will behave. Even if, theoretically, one could plan a performance in advance by deciding 
which modules to play, in which order and roughly how, this would be counterproductive, as the 
arrivals at unique intra-actions is where a real poiēsis is taking place, and something novel is created. 
This requires a free mode of improvisation and listening, but also practice and exploration of the sonic 
potentials of the system. The system as a whole forms a cognitive assemblage of acting processes on 
many levels: the synthesis processes organise as a whole, although they are only aware of their 
neighbours; they are shaped by one another and by time-aware controllers, moved by the hands of a 
human body. The fact that control inputs are not only setting parameters, but also generate and 
capture an intra-action between physical input and algorithmic processes, means that the system 
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cannot have a neutral relation to performance, and that human agency is decomposed to the more 






Texton Mirrors and Intra-action are compositions which demand improvisation because agency is 
required of both algorithm and human, and its consequences are always contingent on unpredicted 
response. The works are intra-active not only in how they are constituted technologically, but also in 
that composition and improvisation cannot be isolated from one another, but bring each other into 
existence. Even if the computer system were to be regarded as composition alone, it could not be 
conceived as music without recourse to the improvised performances that make it sound. Such 
improvisation is an exploration of the encoded sound-structural topologies, and the only way to 
account for the possible sound manifestations of the works.  
This practice endeavours to present an acousmatic sound experience which is anchored in a 
process of making, where technology is not a transparent reproduction of supposed sound sources 
hidden behind a Pythagorean veil. The cognitive assemblage of human mind-body parts and computer 
algorithms is productive rather than reproductive, and the sound therefore has no origin other than the 
present performance-technology domain of embodiment, materiality and information. As composition 
practice, this demonstrates one way of encoding real-time poiēsis into acousmatic music, through 
algorithmic studio composition, completed through improvisation. As improvisation practice, it is a 
model for live performance in the acousmatic and spatial computer music arena. The techniques show 
how a rich multi-layered performative sound palette and texture can be encoded into a performance 
system, while maintaining a thoroughly dynamic relationship between computer-generated sound and 
performance input.  
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